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Abstract
Diagnosing storage system failures is challenging even
for professionals. One example is the “When Solid State
Drives Are Not That Solid” incident occurred at Algo-
lia data center, where Samsung SSDs were mistakenly
blamed for failures caused by a Linux kernel bug. With
the system complexity keeps increasing, such obscure
failures will likely occur more often.
As one step to address the challenge, we present our
on-going efforts called X-Ray. Different from traditional
methods that focus on either the software or the hard-
ware, X-Ray leverages virtualization to collects events
across layers, and correlates them to generate a corre-
lation tree. Moreover, by applying simple rules, X-Ray
can highlight critical nodes automatically. Preliminary
results based on 5 failure cases shows that X-Ray can
effectively narrow down the search space for failures.
1 Motivation
The storage stack is witnessing a sea-change driven by
the advances in non-volatile memory (NVM) technolo-
gies [58, 53, 60, 65, 46, 87, 77, 51, 84]. For example,
flash-based solid state drives (SSDs) and persistent mem-
ories (PMs) are replacing hard disk drives (HDDs) as the
durable device [93, 2, 73, 31, 12, 4]; NVMe [28] and
CXL [7] are redefining the host-device interface; blk-
mq [49] alleviates the single queue and lock contention
bottleneck at the block I/O layer; the SCSI subsystem
and the Ext4 file system, which have been tuned for
HDDs for decades, are also being adapted for NVM (e.g.,
scsi-mq [32, 55, 91] and DAX [9]); in addition, vari-
ous NVM-oriented new designs/optimizations have been
proposed (e.g., F2FS [67], NOVA [94], Kevlar [59]),
some of which require cohesive modifications through-
out the storage stack (e.g., the TRIM support [34]).
The new systems generally offer higher performance.
However, as a disruptive technology, the NVM-based
components have to co-exist with the traditional storage
ecosystem, which is notoriously complex and difficult to
OS (Kernel) SSD-1 SSD-2 SSD-3
Debian 6.0 (2.6.32) 317 27 0
Ubuntu 14.04 (3.16) 88 1 0
Table 1: SSDs exhibit different symptoms when tested
on different OSes. Each cell shows the average number
of errors. Reported by [101].
get right despite decades of efforts [95, 79, 71, 86]. Com-
pared with the performance gain, the implication on sys-
tem reliability is much less studied or understood.
One real example is the “When Solid-State Drives Are
Not That Solid” incident occurred in Algolia data cen-
ter [31], where a random subset of SSD-based servers
crashed and corrupted files for unknown reasons. The
developers “spent a big portion of two weeks just isolat-
ing machines and restoring data as quickly as possible”.
After trying to diagnose almost all software in the stack
(e.g., Ext4, mdadm [1]), and switching SSDs from differ-
ent vendors, they finally (mistakenly) concluded that it
was Samsung’s SSDs to blame. Samsung’s SSDs were
criticized and blacklisted, until one month later Samsung
engineers found that it was a TRIM-related Linux kernel
bug that caused the failure [30].
As another example, Zheng et al. studied the behavior
of SSDs under power fault [100]. The testing framework
bypassed the file system, but relied on the block I/O layer
to apply workloads and check the behavior of devices.
In other words, the SSDs were essentially evaluated to-
gether with the block I/O layer. Their initial experiments
were performed on Linux kernel v2.6.32, and eight out
of fifteen SSDs exhibited a symptom called “serializa-
tion errors” [100]. However, in their follow-up work
where similar experiments were conducted on a newer
kernel (v3.16.0) [101], the authors observed that the fail-
ure symptoms on some SSDs changed significantly (see
Table 1, adapted from [101]). It was eventually con-
firmed that the different symptoms was caused by a sync-
related Linux kernel bug [101].
One commonality of the two cases above is that peo-
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ple try to infer the behavior of storage devices indirectly
through the operating system (OS) kernel, and they tend
to believe that the kernel is correct. This is natural in
practice because users typically have to access storage
devices with the help of the kernel, and they usually do
not have the luxury of inspecting the device behavior di-
rectly. Also, NVM devices are relatively young com-
pared with the long history of the OS kernel, so they
might seem less trustable. We call such common prac-
tice as a top-down approach.
Nevertheless, both cases show that the OS kernel may
play a role in causing system failures, while the device
may be innocent. More strangely, in both cases, differ-
ent devices seem to have different sensitivity to the ker-
nel bug, and some devices may even “tolerate” the kernel
bug. For example, no failure was observed on Intel SSDs
in the Algolia case [31], and the SSD-3 in Table 1 never
exhibited any serialization errors in Zheng et al.’s exper-
iments [100]. Since switching devices is one simple and
common strategy to identify device issues when diagnos-
ing system failures, the different sensitivity of devices to
the software bugs can easily drive the investigation to the
wrong direction, wasting human efforts and resulting in
wrong conclusions, as manifested in the two cases above.
In fact, similar confusing and debatable failures are
not uncommon today [29, 33, 27, 16]. With the trend of
storage devices becoming more capable and more special
features are being exposed to the host-side software [78,
41, 36], the interaction between hardware and software is
expected to be more complex. Consequently, analyzing
storage system failures solely based on the existing top-
down approach will likely become more problematic. In
other words, new methodologies for diagnosing failures
of the storage stack are much needed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we
discuss the limitations of existing efforts (§2); Next, we
introduce our idea (§3) and the preliminary results (§4);
Finally, we describe other related work (§5) and conclude
with the discussion topics section (§6).
2 Why Existing Efforts Are Not Enough
In this section, we discuss two groups of existing efforts
that may alleviate the challenge of diagnosing storage
stack failures to some extent. We defer the discussion of
other related work (e.g., diagnosing performance issues
and distributed systems) to §5.
2.1 Testing the Storage Software Stack
Great efforts have been made to test the storage software
in the stack [95, 74, 76, 99], with the goal of expos-
ing bugs that could lead to failures. For example, EX-
PLODE [95] and B3 [76] apply fault injections to detect
crash-consistency bugs in file systems.
However, testing tools are generally not suitable for di-
agnosing system failures because they typically require a
well-controlled environment (e.g., a highly customized
kernel [95, 76]), which may be substantially different
from the storage stack that need to be diagnosed.
2.2 Practical Diagnosing Tools
To some extent, failure diagnosis is the reverse process
of fault injection testing. Due to the importance, many
practical tools have been built, including the following:
Debuggers [14, 52, 18] are the de facto way to diag-
nose system failures. They usually support fine-grained
manual inspection (e.g., set breakpoints, check memory
bytes). However, significant human efforts are needed to
harness the power and diagnose the storage stack. The
manual effort required will keep increasing as the soft-
ware becomes more complex. Also, these tools typically
cannot collect the device information directly.
Software Tracers [26, 3, 10, 57] can collect various
events from a target system to help understand the be-
havior. However, similar to debuggers, they focus on
host-side events only, and usually do not have automa-
tion support for failure inspection.
Bus Analyzers [15, 23] are hardware equipments that
can capture the communication data between a host sys-
tem and a device, which are particularly useful for an-
alyzing the device behavior. However, since they only
report bus-level information, they cannot help much on
understanding system-level behaviors.
Note that both debuggers and software tracers repre-
sent the traditional top-down diagnosis approach. On the
other hand, bus analyzers have been used to diagnose
some of the most obscure failures that involved host-
device interactions [8, 80], but they are not as convenient
as the software tools.
3 X-Ray: A Cross-Layer Approach
Our goal is to help practitioners to narrow down the the
root causes of storage system failures quickly. To this
end, we are exploring a framework called X-Ray, which
is expected to have the following key features:
• Full stack: many critical operations (e.g., sync,
TRIM) require cohesive support at both device and
host sides; inspecting only one side (and assuming
the other side is correct) is fundamentally limited;
• Isolation: the device information should be col-
lected without relying on the host-side software
(which may be problematic itself);
• Usability: no special hardware or software modi-
fication is needed; manual inspection should be re-
duced as much as possible.
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Figure 1: The X-Ray Approach. The target software stack is hosted in a virtual machine; DevAgent, HostAgent, and
X-Explorer are the three main components; the basic mode visualizes a correlation tree for inspection; the advanced
mode highlights critical nodes based on rules.
3.1 Overview
Figure 1 shows an overview of the X-Ray framework,
which includes three major components: DevAgent,
HostAgent, and X-Explorer.
First, we notice that the virtualization technology is
mature enough to support unmodified OS today [25, 19,
20]. Moreover, recent research efforts have enabled em-
ulating sophisticated storage devices in a virtual ma-
chine (VM), including SATA SSDs (e.g., VSSIM [96])
and NVMe SSDs (e.g., FEMU [68]). Therefore, we
can leverage virtualization to support cross-layer anal-
ysis with high fidelity and no hardware dependence.
Specifically, we host the target storage software stack
in a QEMU VM [47]. At the virtual device layer, the
DevAgent (§3.2) monitors the commands (e.g., SCSI,
NVMe) transferred from the kernel under the bug-
triggering workload. Optionally, the associated data (i.e.,
bits transferred by commands) can be recorded too.
Meanwhile, to understand the high-level semantics of
the system activities, the HostAgent (§3.3) monitors the
function invocations throughout the software stack (e.g.,
system calls, kernel internal functions), and records them
with timestamps at the host side. Optionally, key vari-
ables may be recorded too with additional overhead.
The X-Explorer (§3.4) helps to diagnose the system
behavior in two modes: (1) the basic mode visualizes a
correlation tree of cross-layer events for inspection; (2)
the advanced mode highlights critical events based on
rules, which can be either specified by the user or derived
from a normal system execution.
3.2 DevAgent
The device-level information is helpful because stor-
age failures are often related to the persistent states,
and changing persistent states (in)correctly requires
(in)correct device command sequences. The DevAgent
records the information in a command log directly with-
out any dependency on the host-side kernel (which might
be buggy itself), similar to the bus analyzer [15].
SCSI Device. The Linux kernel communicates with a
SCSI device by sending Command Descriptor Blocks
(CDBs) over the bus. QEMU maintains a struct
SCSICommand for each SCSI command, which con-
tains a 16-byte buffer (SCSICommand->buf) holding the
CDB. Every SCSI command type is identified by the op-
code at the beginning of the CDB, and the size of CDB
is determined by the opcode. For example, the CDB for
the WRITE 10 command is represented by the first 10
bytes of the buffer. For simplicity, we always transfer 16
bytes from the buffer to the command log and use the
opcode to identify valid bytes. QEMU classifies SCSI
commands into either Direct Memory Access (DMA)
commands (e.g., READ 10) or Admin commands (e.g.,
VERIFY 10), and both are handled in the same way in
DevAgent since they share the same structure.
NVMe Device. QEMU maintains a struct
NvmeCmd for each NVMe command, and emulates
the io uring[22, 17] interface to transfer NVMe
commands to a NVMe device, The interface defines two
types of command queues: submission and completion.
The submission queues are further classified into either
I/O submission queue or Admin submission queue,
which are processed via nvme process sq io and
nvme process sq admin in QEMU respectively. The
DevAgent intercepts both queues and records both I/O
commands and Admin commands, similar to SCSI.
3.3 HostAgent
The HostAgent aims to track host-side events to help un-
derstand the high level semantics of system activities. As
mentioned in §2, many tracers have been developed with
different tradeoffs [21]. The current prototype of HostA-
gent is based on ftrace [13], which has native support
on Linux based on kprobes [3]. We select ftrace [13]
because its convenient support on tracing caller-callee
relationship. When CONFIG FUNCTION GRAPH TRACER
is defined, the ftrace graph call routine will store
the pointer to the parent to a ring buffer at function re-
turn via the link register, which is ideal for X-Ray. On
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Figure 2: A partial correlation tree. The tree includes one syscall (green), 704 kernel functions (white nodes), and
3 device commands (blue); the critical path (red) is selected by a simple rule: all ancestors of the command nodes.
the other hand, ftrace only records function execution
time instead of the epoch time needed for synchroniza-
tion with DevAgent events. To workaround the limita-
tion, we modify the front end of ftrace to record the
epoch time at system calls, and calculates the epoch time
of kernel functions based on their execution time since
the corresponding system calls. Another issue we ob-
serve is that ftrace may miss executed kernel functions.
We are working on improving the completeness.
3.4 X-Explorer
The events collected by DevAgent and HostAgent are
valuable for diagnosis. However, the quantity is usually
too large for manual inspection. Inspired by the visual-
ization layer of other diagnosis tools [48, 88, 39, 81], the
X-Explorer visualizes the relationships among the events
and highlights the critical ones.
3.4.1 TreeBuilder
The TreeBuilder generates a correlation tree to represent
the relationships among events in the storage stack. The
tree contains three types of nodes based on the events
from HostAgent and DevAgent: (1) SYSCALL nodes
represent the system calls invoked in the bug-triggering
workload; (2) KERNEL nodes represent the internal ker-
nel functions involved; (3) CMD nodes represent the
commands observed at the device.
There are two types of edges in the tree: (1) the edges
among SYSCALL and KERNEL nodes represent func-
tion invocation relations (i.e., parent and child); (2) the
edges between CMD nodes and other nodes represent
close relations in terms of time. In other words, the
device-level events are correlated to the host-side events
based on timestamps. While the idea is straightforward,
we observe an out-of-order issue caused by virtualiza-
tion: the HostAgent timestamp is collected within the
VM, while the DevAgent timestamp is collected outside
the VM; the device commands may appear to occur be-
fore the corresponding system calls based on the raw
timestamps. To workaround the issue, we set up an NTP
server [24] at the DevAgent side and perform NTP syn-
chronization at the HostAgent Side. We find that such
NTP based synchronization may mitigate the timestamp
gap to a great extent, as will be shown in §4. Another
potential solution is to modify the dynamic binary trans-
lation (DBT) layer of QEMU to minimize the latency.
3.4.2 TreePruner
The correlation tree is typically large due to the com-
plexity of the storage stack. Inspired by the rule-based
diagnosis tools [48], the TreePruner traverses the tree and
highlights the critical paths and nodes (i.e., the paths and
nodes of interest) automatically based on a set of rules
stored in the RuleDB, which can be either specified by
the user or derived from a normal system execution.
User-specified rules. Users may specify expected re-
lations among system events as rules. For example, the
sync-family system calls (e.g., sync, fsync) should gen-
erate SYNC CACHE (SCSI) or FLUSH (NVMe) com-
mands to the device, which is crucial for crash con-
sistency; similarly, blkdev fsync should be triggered
when calling fsync on a raw block device. In addition,
users may also specify simple rules to reduce the tree
(e.g., all ancestor nodes of WRITE commands).
Our current prototype hard-coded a few rules as tree
traversal operations based on the failure cases we stud-
ied (§4). We are exploring more flexible interfaces (e.g.,
SQL-like [61] or formula-based [50]) to enable express-
ing more sophisticated rules.
Normal system execution. Failures are often tricky to
reproduce due to different environments (e.g., different
kernel versions) [6]. In other words, failures may not al-
ways manifest even under the same bug-triggering work-
loads. Based on this observation, and inspired by delta
debugging [97, 75], we may leverage a normal system
execution as a reference when available.
When a normal system is available, we host the corre-
sponding software stack in the X-Ray VM and build the
correlation tree under the same bug-triggering workload.
For clarity, we name the tree from the normal system ex-
ecution as the reference tree, which essentially captures
the implicit rules among events in the normal execution.
By comparing the trees, divergences that cause different
symptoms can be identified quickly.
Accepted as Poster at 12th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Storage and File Systems (HotStorage’20). Feedback Welcome!
Figure 3: Comparison. (a) the critical path from Fig-
ure 2; (b) the critical path from a reference tree.
4 Preliminary Results
We have built a preliminary prototype of X-Ray and ap-
plied it to diagnose 5 failure cases based on real bugs
from the literature [101, 70, 76, 63]. We discuss one case
in details and summarize the results at the end.
Case Study. Figure 2 shows a partial correlation tree
for diagnosing a failure where synchronous writes ap-
pear to be committed out of order on a raw block device.
The tree starts with a syscall node (green), which trig-
gers 704 kernel functions (white nodes) and three device
commands (blue nodes). The red lines shows the critical
path and nodes selected by one simple rule: “ancestors
of device commands” (Rule#3). The tree itself is part of
the original tree (not shown) selected via another simple
rule: “syscalls with WRITE commands” (Rule#1).
Figure 3 (a) shows a zoomed in version of the critical
path and nodes from Figure 2. We can easily see that the
fsync syscall only generates three WRITE (0x2a) com-
mands without explicitly sending SYNC CACHE (0x35)
command to the device, which is incorrect based on
POSIX. Further investigation confirms that the root cause
lies in the blkdev fsync node on the critical path.
When a normal system is available, X-Ray may help
more. Figure 3 (b) shows the critical path on a reference
tree. Apparently, the SYNC CACHE (0x35) command
appears, and a new function blkdev issue flush is
involved. By comparison, it is clear that the difference
stems from the blkdev fsync node.
ID Original Rule#1 Rule#2 Rule#3
1 11,353 704 571 30
(100%) (6.20%) (5.03%) (0.26%)
2 34,083 697 328 22
(100%) (2.05%) (0.96%) (0.06%)
3 24,355 1,254 1,210 15
(100%) (5.15%) (4.97%) (0.06%)
4 273,653 10,230 9,953 40
(100%) (3.74%) (3.64%) (0.01%)
5 284,618 5,621 5,549 50
(100%) (1.97%) (1.95%) (0.04%)
Table 2: Result Summary.
Summary. Table 2 summarizes the result. Besides
Rule#1 and Rule#3, we define another Rule#2: “func-
tions between the syscall and commands”. Table 2 shows
the node count of the original tree and the node counts af-
ter applying each rule. The bold cell means the root cause
can be covered by the nodes selected via the correspond-
ing rule. Overall, the simple rules can effectively narrow
down the search space for root cause (0.06% - 4.97% of
the original trees). We are studying other failure patterns
and developing more intelligent rules.
5 Related Work
Analyzing Storage Devices. Many researchers have
studied the behaviors of storage devices in depth, includ-
ing both HDDs [43, 44, 56, 64, 82] and SSDs [38, 54, 58,
60, 66, 69, 83, 89, 72]. For example, Maneas et al. [72]
study the reliability of 1.4 million SSDs deployed in Ne-
tApp RAID systems. Generally, these studies provide
valuable insights for reasoning complex system failures
involving device, which is complementary to X-Ray.
Diagnosing Distributed Systems. Great efforts have
been made on tracing and analyzing distributed systems
[40, 45, 88, 62, 81, 42]. For example, Aguilera et al. [40]
trace network messages and infer causal relationships
and latencies to diagnose performance issues. Similar
to X-Ray, these methods need to align traces. However,
their algorithms typically make use of unique features
of network events (e.g., RPC Send/Receive pairs, IDs in
message headers), which are not available for X-Ray. On
the other hand, some statistic based methods [62] are po-
tentially applicable when enough traces are collected.
Software Engineering. Many software engineering
techniques have been proposed for diagnosing user-level
programs (e.g., program slicing [37, 92, 98], delta debug-
ging [97, 75], checkpoint/re-execution [85, 90]). In gen-
eral, applying them directly to the storage stack remains
challenging due to the complexity. On the other hand,
some high-level ideas are likely applicable. For example,
Sambasiva et al. [81] apply delta debugging to compare
request flows to diagnose performance problems in Ursa
Minor [35], similar to the reference tree part of X-Ray.
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6 Discussion Topics Section
Emulating Storage Devices. As mentioned in §3, so-
phisticated SATA/NVMe SSDs have been emulated in
QEMU VM [96, 68]. Among others, such efforts are
important for realizing the VM-based full-stack tracing
and diagnosis. However, we do have observed some lim-
itations of existing emulated devices, which may affect
the failure reproducing (and thus diagnosis) in VM. For
example, advanced features like the TRIM operation are
not fully supported on VSSIM or FEMU yet, but the Al-
golia failure case [31] requires a TRIM-capable device
to manifest. As a result, we are not able to reproduce the
Algolia failure in VM. Therefore, emulating storage de-
vices precisely would be helpful for the X-Ray approach
and/or failure analysis in general, in addition to the other
well-known benefits [96, 68]. We would like to discuss
how to improve the emulation accuracy under practical
constraints (e.g., confidentiality).
Deriving Rules. The automation of X-Ray depends on
the rules. The current prototype hard-coded a number of
simple rules based on our preliminary study and domain
knowledge, which is limited. We would like to explore
other implicit rules in the storage stack with other do-
main experts. Also, we plan to collect correlation trees
from normal system executions and apply machine learn-
ing algorithms to derive the potential rules. We would
like to discuss the feasibility.
Other Usages of X-Ray. We envision that some other
analysis could be enabled by X-Ray. For example, with
precise latency and casual relationships among events,
we may identify the paths that are critical for I/O perfor-
mance, similar to the request flow analysis in distributed
systems [81]. Another possibility is to measure the write
amplification at different layers across the stack. We
would like to discuss the opportunities.
Other Challenges of Failure Diagnosis. There are other
challenges that are not covered by X-Ray. For exam-
ple, X-Ray assumes that there is a bug-triggering work-
load that can reliably lead to the failure. In practice,
deriving bug-triggering workloads from user workloads
(which may be huge or inconvenient to share) is often
tricky [11, 5]. We would like to discuss such challenges.
Sharing Failure Logs. The cross-layer approach would
be most effective for diagnosing obscure failures that in-
volve both the OS kernel and the device [31, 101]. Based
on our communications with storage practitioners, such
failures are not uncommon. However, the details of such
failures are usually unavailable to the public, which lim-
its the use cases that could shape the design of reliabil-
ity tools like X-Ray. The availability of detailed failure
logs at scale is critical for moving similar research ef-
forts forward. We would like to discuss how to improve
log sharing given constraints (e.g., privacy).
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